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Abstract 
In this paper I suggest that we might understand some features of contemporary 
populism by reworking the concept of ‘authoritarian populism’ first proposed by 
Stuart Hall in his analysis of ‘Thatcherism’.  Following a brief review of my 
earlier analytics of ‘governing through freedom,  I suggest that while the political 
movements identified by the names of Trump, Wilders, Le Pen, the Austrian 
Freedom Party, the True Finns etc. may be ephemeral,  it is worth considering 
whether they are beginning to articulate a new set of rationalities and technologies 
for governing ‘after neoliberalism’.  I analyse some key elements of 
these movements, the new epistemologies that they employ, and the ethopolitics 
that they espouse, and suggest that the key operative concepts may be  ‘the 
people’, security, and control. We may still be ‘birds on the wire’ as Leonard 
Cohen once put it, but perhaps what we are enjoined to seek in these strategies 
for ‘governing liberty’ is not so much freedom but security. 
 
Keywords: authoritarian populism; governmentality;  liberty; the people; 
security; control. 
 
 
I am not trying to say that liberation as such, or this or that form of 
liberation, does not exist: when a colonized people attempts to liberate 
itself from its colonizers, this is indeed a practice of liberation in the 
strict sense. But we know very well… that this practice of liberation is 
not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that will still be 
needed if this people, this society, and these individuals are to be able to 
define admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society. 
This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of 
liberation; … [demands for liberation] … do not seem to me, to be 
capable by themselves of defining all the practical forms of freedom…. . 
(Michel Foucault, 1994, pp. 282-283) 
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Introduction1 
Freiheit – who of my generation can forget Leonard Bernstein conducting 
Beethoven’s 9th Symphony in East Berlin at Christmas 1989 to celebrate the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, with Freiheit – freedom – replacing Freude – Joy – an ode to 
freedom.2 Freedom was on everyone’s lips in the revolutions in government in the 
1980s commonly termed ‘neoliberalism’: the triumph of the free world over 
communism, the triumph of the free market over the planned economy, the 
triumph of the autonomous individual ‘free to choose’. But – in what I prefer to 
term ‘advanced liberalism’3 - freedom was not just as a slogan of resistance, but a 
doctrine for governing. It was not just rhetoric, nor simply a ‘political rationality’ 
but was linked to ‘technologies’ for rendering that rationality operational. That 
was the argument of my inaugural lecture at Goldsmiths College in 1992 – 25 
years ago – which I called Towards a critical sociology of freedom (Rose, 1992). 
I wrote that lecture in an untimely spirit, that is to say against the spirit of the 
times, in the sense which Friedrich Nietzsche gives to the term at the start of his 
Untimely meditation on 'The uses and disadvantages of history for life': 'I do not 
know what meaning [my studies] could have for our time', he says, 'if they were 
not untimely ‐ that is to say, acting counter to our time, and therefore acting on 
our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come' (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 
60). However, my aim in that lecture was not to argue that the freedom that we 
were being offered was a sham, and to hope for a more authentic freedom to 
come. Rather, I argued that to govern in the name of freedom required translating 
that language into technologies, to render freedom technical, both in terms of 
governing practices for our authorities and in terms of ethical technologies for 
ourselves. And I suggested that while the paradoxes of the welfare state had come 
under sustained attack from both left, right and liberals over the preceding twenty 
years (Hirschman, 1991), it was the right, rather than the left, that managed to 
shape an alternative mode of governing, framed around the ideas of freedom and 
autonomy, and inventing or repurposing a whole variety of devices for rendering 
those technical. What had emerged was not ‘liberation’ but a set of mechanisms 
for administering a population that depended upon the capacities of free 
individuals, which gave that freedom a very particular form, and which utilized a 
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range of technologies to inculcate the attributes thought necessary for individuals 
and organizations to conduct themselves in freedom.4 
That was then, this is now. Where is freedom today, in the era of 
‘authoritarian populism’? Or to put it another way, to diagnose what is going on 
today, would we start with the question of freedom? I began to wonder about this 
when I first heard the name of Jorg Haider’s right wing nationalist party in 
Austria – the Austrian Freedom Party. And then of Geert Wilder’s analogous 
movement in the Netherlands – the Dutch Party for Freedom. How, I naively 
wondered, can these right-wing nationalist parties, which seem to any observer to 
be fundamentally illiberal, place themselves under the banner of freedom? True, 
the word is not on the bannerhead of the True Finns, Alternatives for Germany, 
the Danish People’s Party, or the French National Front.5 So is this adoption of 
the word freedom more than a mere political ploy – in the way that the equivalent 
party in Sweden calls itself the Swedish Democratic Party? Is a new 
‘governmentality’ taking shape, and if so, does the question of freedom still lead 
us to its heart?  
In short, I think the answer is yes and no! Or, to put it more precisely, I 
want to argue that, yes, we are seeing the emergence of new ways of thinking 
about how to govern, and new technologies for governing are being adopted or 
invented. And no, while ideas of freedom have not disappeared, we need a 
different analytics of freedom ‘after neoliberalism’,6 not governing in the service 
of freedom but governing to safeguard liberty. And I shall suggest that this 
emerging configuration – we could call it ‘governing liberty’ – is framed in terms 
of the linked ideas of ‘the people’, ‘security’ and ‘control’. But before addressing 
this directly, let me return to those arguments from a quarter of a century ago, and 
say a little about the role that freedom played in the forms of governmentality that 
I termed ‘advanced liberal’. 
 
Governing through freedom 
We have innumerable discussions of what Michel Foucault spoke about when he 
spoke about practices of freedom, whether he had a naturalistic or individualistic 
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conception of freedom, or a purely negative conception of freedom as absence of 
domination, his ideas of freedom versus those of other philosophers and so on 
(Dumm, 2002; Tobias, 2005). In my own analyses of the politics of freedom, my 
concern was different: it was about freedom as an operational element in 
particular regimes of knowledge, power and ethics, about freedom as embodied in 
historically specific practices. And I suggested that governing through freedom, in 
this sense, required difficult ethical evaluation, which certainly was not possible 
in terms of a binary of freedom vs. domination. 
When the languages of freedom came to the fore in the revolutions of 
government in the Global North in the 1980s, we could begin to discern what 
freedom meant, not as a term of resistance – as in the struggles against apartheid 
in South Africa (depicted in the 1987 movie Cry freedom) or in the former Soviet 
dominions of Eastern Europe – but as a set of practices for governing. 
Overarching and underpinning these practices was a notion of freedom framed in 
a specific way: in terms of the ‘autonomy’ of the individual. Autonomy here had a 
paradoxical quality. It was portrayed as a natural desire of all humans, that is to 
say, something that is naturally sought by each human being, and hence does not 
need to be artificially inculcated. Yet, despite that, it seemed that autonomy did 
not automatically spring into being: various socio-political arrangements and 
ethical rectifications were required to create and sustain autonomous subjectivity7. 
In part, this was a matter of undoing some of the social arrangements that had 
accreted over previous decades, and thus releasing individuals from the shackles 
of dependency, and the social webs spun by the state and its agencies. In part, it 
was a matter of ablating the subjective consequences of those arrangements, in 
which individuals, confronted with all sorts of problems in living, looked to 
authorities for resolution. Thus individuals were to be made free, indeed to be 
required to live their lives, and narrate their lives to themselves, as if they were 
the results of acts of choice among alternatives offered, shaped only by personal 
preferences and interests. Once all those artificial constraints were removed, and 
their dire subjective consequences were remedied, the extent to which any 
individual was able to realize this natural autonomy was constrained only by the 
amount of time, effort or capital they were prepared to invest in achieving it.  
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The ethic of autonomy was thus an activist one, and individuals had to be 
activated to engage their own energies in their management of their lives and the 
improvement of their conditions. Unemployed persons were to become job 
seekers, refugees were to become asylum seekers and so forth, but more 
generally, we were all to become seekers after something: self-realization, self-
promotion, maximization of our health, our bodies and our lifestyles through 
consumption. Freedom thus demanded a very particular ethic of the self-tied to 
specific practices and technologies. We were as free as the birds on the wire of 
whom Leonard Cohen wrote – I chose my title on the day he died: like birds on 
the wire trying in our way to be free. It was not so much that we were freed, but 
that we were ‘obliged to be free’ – to try, in our ways, to be free, to imagine our 
life as a kind of enterprise created by acts of free choice, to assume our 
responsibilities as free consumers, freed to take control of choices from 
reproduction to nutrition in the marketplace of options offered to us, freed to 
acquire many new responsibilities for our travails through private insurance for 
health and old age… And the irony was that we were to believe that we must do 
all this in the name of our freedom.  
At least one of the reasons why I preferred the term ‘advanced liberalism’ 
to neoliberalism was that this obligation of freedom arose as a reaction to the 
many criticisms of states of welfare from the left and liberals as well as from 
those, such as Hayek and Friedman, who explicitly espoused a new liberalism. 
The technologies used to reshape social arrangements – the new public 
management, the partial transformation of previously socially provided public 
goods such as health, insurance or education into quasi-markets, and their new 
forms of management by budgets, audits, standards and the like – were not 
inventions of neoliberals, the Chicago boys or any one ‘thought collective’. 
Certainly Hayek’s Road to serfdom and The constitution of liberty, Friedman’s 
Free to choose, and Becker’s ideas about human capital suggested a range of 
possibilities – notably a celebration of market-like relations as the place where 
there is freedom to choose, to maximize one’s financial or human ‘capital’, in a 
domain of competition which, when fully realized, achieves optimal outcomes for 
all. And there may indeed have been formal and informal contacts between these 
and other intellectuals. But the strategies and technologies developed and 
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implemented were a kind of bricolage, some old, some new, some re-purposed, 
some merely re-described, but together forming a new way of thinking about 
individual and collective conduct and trying to govern it, an array of strategies 
that were certainly heterogeneous, but with enough of a ‘family resemblance’ to 
be grouped under a common name. 
Recently, much has been made of the apparent novelty of the popular 
theorists of nudge technologies, and their liberal paternalism which argues, to put 
it crudely – don’t direct people to do things, but shape the ‘choice architecture’ to 
make it easier for them to make the choices that authorities consider desirable 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Whitehead et al., 2014). But there is little new here. 
Those who would govern have almost always aimed to shape the choices of ‘free’ 
individuals in such ways; our freedom to choose was always shaped, managed 
and governed by others, whether those be marketers, professional experts, 
lifestyle gurus or politicians. Perhaps this was most obvious when, after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and again today in China, we can see that to make up a ‘free 
society' requires a whole range of new technologies and their associated experts: 
for example, censuses to provide demographic information on the individuals who 
comprise the nation, or public opinion polls to ‘take the pulse’ of the nation and 
determine the will of the free people, etc. To govern a free people it is necessary 
to know them, so that one can create the delicate but crucial affiliations between 
individual aspirations and governmental objectives.  
Governing in the name of freedom, replacing the administrative welfare 
state and the visible hand of authorities required, did not just require a ‘rolling 
back the state’ and deregulation. The creation of quasi-markets everywhere from 
health care to education required an activist state to create the conditions of these 
notionally free markets and those who would populate them. Indeed, given the 
many failures of strategies of central control to even know, let alone manage, 
what was happening in notionally state-run entities, whether these be railways or 
hospitals, the New Public Management strategies for ‘governing at a distance’ 
significantly extended the capacity of authorities to govern notionally free 
organizations and enterprises by measures such as audits, budgets, standards and 
the like.  
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  Constructing a 'free market' entails a variety of interventions by 
accountants, management consultants, lawyers and industrial relations specialists 
and marketing experts in order to establish the conditions under which the `laws 
of supply and demand' can make themselves real, to implant the capacities, 
competences and ethical technologies of entrepreneurial selves, seeking to 
maximize their own ‘human capital’ through acts of choice, to embed the ways of 
calculating and managing that will make economic actors and organizations think, 
reckon and behave as competitive, profit-seeking agents, to turn workers into 
motivated employees who will strive to maximize their own potential in and 
through work, to generate the means to consume those goods or other things that 
maximize their quality of life; hence to transform everyone into consumers who 
will regard consumption freely chosen in the light of personal preferences as a 
way of meeting and maximizing their very own aspirations. That entails changing 
educational practices to inculcate the attitudes and values of enterprise, changes in 
television programmes from soap operas to game shows to implant the desire for 
wealth creation and personal enterprise (Ouellette & Hay, 2008), as well as the 
activities of marriage guidance consultants and a host of other psychological 
therapists to sort out the difficulties that arise when personal life becomes a matter 
of freedom of choice (Binkley, 2011).8  
When most critics think of neoliberalism, however, it is economic 
‘freedom’ that is uppermost in their minds, in particular ‘deregulation’ – the 
removal of domestic constraints to the freedom of circulation of capital and of 
goods and services. Across most countries in the world – though not all – in a 
series of radical changes to stock markets, border controls, international standards 
regimes and the like, finance capital was freed from many local constraints, 
roaming freely to invest wherever conditions were believed to be conducive to the 
generation of greatest profits. Capital was thus to be freed to constitute and 
exploit an imagined borderless world of global financial trading. Of course, 
capital was highly mobile in the context of colonialism, think only of the East 
India Company, but now production of goods from shirt buttons to motor vehicles 
was freed to move, as capital was invested in factories and industrial plant 
wherever the costs of machinery, rents and labour were lowest, and greatest 
profits could be made. Local and national ‘protectionist’ constraints, such as those 
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that protected certain industries thought to be of national significance, or 
protected and supported farmers or other sectors of the labour force, were to be 
dismantled. Goods and services as well, albeit to a lesser extent, were also freed 
by various international treaties to roam across national borders, though the world 
was never quite as flat and borderless as some popular representations suggested 
(Friedman, 2005).  
Some analysts emphasize the benefits that have been achieved, arguing 
that the ‘expansion of global trade has rescued millions from abject poverty. 
Foreign direct investment has often been a way to transfer technology and know-
how to developing economies. Privatization of state owned enterprises has in 
many instances led to more efficient provision of services and lowered the fiscal 
burden on governments’ (Ostry et al., 2016, p. 38). But even those who supported 
these policies recognize that they have increased inequality in the Global North, 
and that the migration of capital to the places where production of goods and the 
provision of services was cheapest – to sweatshops and factories in China and 
Malaysia, or call centres and IT support to India – has had dire consequences for 
the industrial workforce in the Global North, especially in the peripheries of 
Europe and in the rust belts of the United States. As the same time this freedom of 
migratory capital has exacerbated the challenges posed by migratory labour – in 
particular, the movements of those who refused to accept their geographical bad 
luck in being born in the wrong place (Kearns & Reid-Henry, 2009). Thus 
‘globalization’ can now be reframed as a dire threat to the vital security of one’s 
own national population. All this is, of course, very well-known. However, as we 
also know, problems of one strategy of government are the opportunities for 
another – and in this case the opportunities have been seized by one particular 
style of political thought which – to redeploy the term developed by Stuart Hall in 
another politico-historical context – I term ‘authoritarian populism’ (Hall, 1985). 
 
Post-neoliberal rationalities? 
Now, of course, there is a large literature on populism, on what it is and is not, on 
whether it is or is not the enemy of democracy, or the inescapable shadow of 
democracy and so forth (Fraser, 2016; Müller, 2016; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; 
Kaltwasser et al., 2017).9 Most agree on one thing – that while populism takes 
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many forms, all populist movements are grounded in the growth of 
disappointment, despair and sometimes rage at the machinations of governing 
bodies and the elites that control them. It grows from the belief that those 
institutions and elites live in a world of their own, that they forget or ignore the 
plight and the will of the people they are supposed to serve, and that the answer is 
to create a new and direct relationship between those who are ruled and those who 
rule, bypassing or at least supplementing the ‘representative’ technologies of 
parliamentary type democracy.  
Nonetheless, despite these common themes, some argue that the populism 
of Trumpism, Wilderism, Le Penism and the like is simply a cynical attempt to 
harness these discontents for their own political ends. That they articulate 
opposition to the status quo does not amount to a strategy for governing, but is 
seen as essentially pragmatic and incoherent, latching on to whatever grievance 
they can find among a throng made up of those who feel aggrieved, dispossessed, 
ignored, almost a minority in their own land. Typically critics say that the 
constituency for such appeals is largely made up of angry white men with limited 
education who seek someone to blame and someone to articulate that blame: the 
liberal consensus of experts and elites, with their snobbish disdain for those who 
lack the refinements of their class; their political correctness, which betrays the 
true people, their cronyism which undermines their democratic credentials; their 
part in a system that systematically advantages them and their kind; their 
cosmopolitanism, which embraces every shade of identity apart from that of their 
own true population.  
So why have I adopted the term ‘authoritarian populism’ for this kind of 
politics? Of course, Stuart Hall developed this concept in a radically different 
‘conjuncture’ in the Britain of the 1980s, in part by re-jigging Nicos Poulanzas’s 
idea of authoritarian statism (Poulantzas, 1978): 'popular consent', Hall argued 
'can be so constructed, by a historical bloc seeking hegemony, as to harness to its 
support some popular discontents, neutralize the opposing forces, disaggregate the 
opposition and really incorporate some strategic elements of popular opinion into 
its own hegemonic project' (Hall, 1985, p. 118). Thatcherism, as he termed it, and 
the new right more generally, paradoxically combined an apparent opposition to 
the powers of the extended state, as in its attack on the welfare state, with an 
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appeal to the people. But in this configuration, the people were not summoned for 
popular mobilization, but to place their faith in a powerful leader who stands for 
their values and who will, in his or her turn, reconstruct the terrain of politics, of 
the ‘common sense’ of politics, along the lines of their own ‘spontaneous’ beliefs. 
Thatcherism, here, was an internally contradictory phenomenon which 'managed 
to stitch up or ‘unify’ the contradictory strands in its discourse - the resonant 
themes of organic Toryism – nation, family, duty, authority, standards, 
traditionalism, patriarchalism – with the aggressive themes of a revived neo- 
liberalism – self-interest, competitive individualism, anti-statism' as he put it in an 
earlier piece called ‘the great moving right show' (ibid.: p. 122, citing Hall, 1979).  
Now I am not suggesting a ‘return to Gramsci’ or a revival of the themes 
of ideology and hegemony. But I am suggesting that there are similar themes in 
today’s ‘authoritarian populism’ which ‘stitches together’ some themes that 
resonate with a particular disaffected constituency with the idea, not of a strong 
state, but of a strong and seemingly powerful leader who will not be bound by the 
prevailing common sense of politics – who will precisely try to create a new 
‘common sense’. In asking whether this is more than political rhetoric, my aim 
(which was the aim of Stuart Hall, and the aim of the work I did with Peter Miller 
to operationalize the analytics of ‘governmentality’) was to suggest that 
progressives might have something to learn about the conduct of political 
contestation by taking seriously the form of these arguments, and their challenge 
to the common sense of ‘the left’ (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992; 
some of the early empirical papers are now collected in Miller & Rose, 2008). 
Our analytics of governmentality aimed to identify – though not to celebrate – the 
inventiveness in politics that had been achieved by those political forces that we 
termed ‘advanced liberal’, an inventiveness which I, at least, found lacking in 
both traditional and radical strategies of ‘the left’ (Rose, 1999a).  
We argued that such an analysis could productively focus on two 
dimensions – political rationalities and governmental technologies. Let me say a 
few words about each. First, rationalities: We argued that political rationalities 
had three defining characteristics. They had a moral form in that they were 
underpinned by a belief in the proper ends of the government of conduct – 
freedom, justice, equality, mutual responsibility, citizenship, common sense, 
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economic efficiency, prosperity, growth, fairness, rationality and the like – and in 
the proper distribution of powers and duties between authorities in that enterprise 
– what was proper for the state, for the market, for the church, for the family, for 
the individual. They had an epistemological character, in that they were based on 
a particular conception of the domain to be governed – society, the nation, the 
population, the economy – and of the persons over whom government is to be 
exercised – members of a flock to be led, legal subjects with rights, children to be 
educated, a resource to be exploited, elements of a population to be managed. 
And they were articulated in a distinctive idiom, a language that was more than 
rhetoric, but – however irrational and incoherent it may seem to those who think 
that speech does, or should, take a consistent and reasoned form – was an 
intellectual technology, an apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way 
that it is amenable to political deliberations. Political rationalities, that is to say, 
are morally coloured, grounded upon knowledge, and made thinkable and 
practicable through language.  
Now if we were, for a moment, to take seriously – and indeed literally – 
the arguments of the authoritarian populists, we would see that the ends of 
government were not formulated in terms of freedom, or even of prosperity, but in 
terms of greatness, pride, identity; of we, the people, a sense of our worth in the 
world, with many symbolic acts to mark that greatness – a greatness under threat, 
demeaned, disrespected, not just by our enemies but even by those who have 
governed us in the past, who have failed to give our identity its true name. So 
government was to be exercised in the name of ‘the people’. But who speaks for 
the people? We cannot rely on those political elites, with their cosy cabals and 
endless committees, with their comfortable lives in the corridors of power ‘inside 
the beltway’ or in ‘Westminster’: they have abandoned their duty to speak in the 
name of the real people, the true people. Indeed, we cannot rely on the state 
machinery to reform itself, so that it does once more align with the values of those 
true people, for it has been captured by the bureaucrats and their experts. No, 
some fearless individual, somehow immune to the blackmail of convention and 
the lure of the elite, is required to speak for the people. It does not matter if he or 
she does or does not come from the people: that is not the issue. The issue is that 
they recognize the people as the true source of moral authority, and hence of 
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legitimate political authority. They accept, they commit themselves to the fearless 
articulation of the will of the people. I love the people, and they love me – I do 
not ‘represent’ them, as if they cannot speak for themselves, I speak their words. 
However much you intellectuals sneer at my speeches and you politicians snipe at 
the twists and turns in my policies, my words are their words and my wishes are 
their wishes. Not ‘we, the people’ but ‘I, the people’, as Robert Singh puts in in 
the title of his ‘deflationary interpretation of populism’ (Singh, 2017).  
A kind of epistemology follows from this moral valorization of ‘the 
people’, for ‘the people’ do not consist simply of all those who happen to inhabit 
a territory, but only those who form part of that moral community of the people, 
who share a history, who have common values, who stand for an identity. They 
are hardworking, resilient, down to earth individualists, who strive to manage the 
lives of their families, often against the odds using their own resources, helped out 
– spontaneously, no thanks required, I’d do the same for you – not by any state or 
public authority, but by their neighbours. And they are nationalists in the sense 
that they recognize that ours is the country where their values are valued, they are 
at liberty to pursue their ends in these ways, and, if necessary, they are prepared 
to defend it against those who deride or subvert it. Thus, those values and beliefs 
operate as the basis to make the distinction within the population, in order to 
recognize those who are not the people – whether asylum seekers who don’t share 
our values, or welfare recipients, who are parasitic on us, or liberal intellectuals 
who, in their stupid wisdom and in the name of abstract principles of civil rights, 
defend all minorities, with all values, however inimical they are to those that 
made our country what it is. Some might object to the suggestion that this is an 
epistemology, but I think it is: it is a theory of the nature of political subjects, of 
the subjectivities and the ethical values that are to be governed, those in whose 
name one is to govern; which also enables one to know those who are either of no 
concern to government or an active threat to it. And, as I will suggest later, there 
are some important consequences of such an epistemology of the true people. 
As for a distinctive language, well this speaks for itself. A distinctive 
language is not a coherent discourse, but a set of repeated and recognizable 
elements, phrases and aphorisms that make aspects of the world thinkable in a 
way that points to remedial action. For example, at a recent Marine Le Pen rally, 
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‘[w]hen Franck de Lapersonne, an actor and FN supporter, told the rally that 19th 
century writer Victor Hugo "did not learn Arabic at school and that makes me 
happy," he received the loudest ovation of the day, with the crowd chanting the 
party's trademark slogan 'On est chez nous' ('This is our country!')’10. 'Our 
country', 'take back control', 'Make Ruritania great again' – we see here again and 
again the centrality of the idea of a nation state, its identity, its history and 
destiny, its population as an imagined community of values, the firm exclusion of 
all those who challenge or otherwise do not accept that identity; our ‘people’s 
home’ – as they term it in the Nordic countries – is not open to all. So, take back 
control in the name of the people, control by the true people, for the true people. 
And, of course, this gives rise to a simple test to identify those who are not 
of the true people: a patriotic commitment to the values that constitute our 
national identity. As Theresa May put it in her speech to the Conservative Party 
Conference just after becoming leader, and, of course, in the wake of a 
referendum in which about half of those who voted supported the United 
Kingdom leaving the European Union 'If you believe you are a citizen of the 
world, you’re a citizen of nowhere':11 the cosmopolitan deracinated intellectual 
may claim to speak for an enlightened global citizenship of human rights and 
equality, but in reality speaks only for a small privileged elite whose misguided 
beliefs – the belief that their beliefs and values are rationally irrefutable and 
universal – are a fundamental threat to the territorialised, particularised, nativist 
values and beliefs of ordinary working people. These intellectuals are no patriots; 
they – and the experts who support them, even the judiciary – are ‘enemies of the 
people’.12 
What, then, of freedom? At first glance, the language of freedom seems to 
play little part. Yet a language that resonates with freedom is deployed to defend 
the right and the authority of the people to ‘stand up courageously for the real 
values of our country’ and hence to be intolerant of those whose values threaten 
our values. To this freedom, to 'live free or die' as it is put in the official motto of 
the State of New Hampshire, the new authoritarian populism gives the name of 
liberty.13 The true people are not really a community or a Gemeinschaft of 
conformity; on the contrary, they are rugged individualists who speak their mind, 
without being constrained by the effete niceties of political correctness, 
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multiculturalism, etc. Indeed those doctrines, and the policies that enact them, 
may justify themselves in the name of civil liberties and the like, but are, in fact, a 
threat to liberty in the name of freedom. No wonder the US conservative 
libertarian website, The Liberty Conservative, headlined its edition of 25 August 
2016 Farage and Trump show the Liberty Movement how it's done.14 Liberty here 
is not a liberty of ‘anything goes’ but the liberty of American, or British, 
nationalism against all those 'reprehensible international bureaucrats' who 
entangle the nation in a web of alliances and treaties, and ensnare it in the grasp of 
international bureaucracies such as the United Nations and superbanks such as the 
International Monetary Fund. Thus, Farage – as a story in the Daily Telegraph in 
March 2014 put it: 'When he speaks of liberty, he does it with a certain something 
in his voice and a glint in his eye'.15 Also at stake here is, of course, the liberty of 
thought, for the so-called freedoms of multiculturalism, with their political 
correctness and their thought police actually cede power to the enemies of liberty. 
But, of course, it is radical Islam which is now the exemplary enemy of liberty. 
For Wilders, Islam is incompatible with freedom: freedom is equated with 
personal liberty, the hard won liberty that ‘we’ gained by freeing ourselves from 
religions dominion over us.16 Le Pen’s manifesto, presented at the rally just 
mentioned, begins with a promise of liberty: ‘L’objectif de ce projet est d’abord 
de rendre sa liberté à la France et la parole au peuple. Car c’est en votre nom, et 
pour votre seul bénéfice, que toute politique nationale doit être menée’ ['The aim 
of this project is first of all to restore liberty to France and to the people, for it is 
in your name and for your own benefit that all national policies must be carried 
out'].17 
What is at stake, then, is a matter of liberation, a kind of internal de-
colonization, of liberating the voice of the real people, doing justice to those 
whose voice has been ignored and forgotten when it has not been ridiculed and 
despised. A commitment to defend – or restore – the culture of the real ‘hard 
working’ down-to-earth people This celebration of the supposed values of the 
people thus differs from the earlier neo-con arguments about demoralization and 
dependency and their conception of an underclass subjectivity weakened and 
poisoned by liberal welfare and lack of authority (Cruikshank, 1998). And, 
indeed, it is epistemological in a second sense, related to that described above, in 
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that it concerns the source of valid knowledge. For knowledge is not to come 
from the experts with their arcane languages, their supposedly scientific 
calculations that have so often proved wrong, their demeaning of ‘common 
sense’. On the contrary, to see is to know - the knowledge that is to inform this 
rationality is the knowledge that ‘everyone knows’ – that comes directly from the 
experience of the real people, undistorted, unmediated by experts – one is 
reminded of Andrew Barry’s analysis of the epistemology of certain protest 
movements in his book Political machines (Barry, 2001). In the good old days of 
Swampy the ecowarrior who chained himself to trees, those protesting against the 
driving of new roads through fields and forests did not bring in experts to support 
their case – they brought the press along to the woods to see the corpses of the 
once magnificent trees and the wounded and despoiled earth torn up by 
bulldozers. Just look, they said, you can see this is wrong - to see is to believe. 
 
Post liberal governmental technologies 
In the schematic of governmentality that we developed to analyze ‘advanced 
liberalism’, Miller and I argued that governmentalities were not just mentalities, 
not just styles of thought or rationalities. On the contrary, to become 
governmental, such thought had to become technical, to link itself to 
governmental technologies: the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, 
techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities 
seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions. Political thought 
becomes governmental when it can link itself to a technology that seems to 
provide a means of realization – though, as I have already mentioned, one that 
usually is ‘congenitally failing’; that is to say, it fails to live up to the ambitions of 
those who try to construct it. From this perspective, we can see that the ‘advanced 
liberal’ premise of freedom – as at the same time a natural state, a universal 
desire, and something that had to be created and fostered by authorities, did 
answer to these demands of rendering itself technical and linking itself to 
technologies for the conduct of the conduct of individuals, collectivities and 
organizations However, it generated a whole range of ‘failures’ of which perhaps 
the most troublesome related to the freedom of circulation of finance capital, 
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goods, services and people – often summed in the discontents with ‘globalization’ 
and the new problematics of security. If the failures of one way of governing are 
the opportunities for another, can these feature of authoritarian populism make 
themselves technical, are they linked to the emergence of post ‘neoliberal’ 
technologies of government?  
For reasons of space, I just want to focus on one issue – security. It is a 
cliché that all liberal democracies struggle with the balance of liberty and 
security. Observing increased border checks, demands for advance passenger 
information for flights, enhanced visa regulations and so forth – not to mention 
Trump’s ill-fated travel ban, and border wall,18 we might be tempted to think that 
it is simply that the balance has now swung to security. We know that many of 
these measures are more symbolic than effective; for example, many similar 
measures were already in place at the time those responsible for the attacks on the 
twin towers in September 2001 entered the United States. But in authoritarian 
populism, the key here is the idea of ‘control’, as in the much-mocked slogan – 
‘take back control’ – that was so much in evidence in the campaign for the United 
Kingdom to leave the European Union. For if the price of liberty is eternal 
vigilance,19 then control seems to promise a way of actualizing that vigilance, 
rendering vigilance technological. Control manages to fuse the demand for liberty 
and the demand for security, and to give this fused objective a technical form.  
Security in welfare states referred both to security of health, income, 
pensions and housing – that is to say internal social security - and to external 
territorial security. In these new styles of thought, the division between internal 
territorial security and external territorial security is re-posed in a new and 
actionable way. In his lectures on Security, territory and population, Michel 
Foucault distinguished two strategies of security: centripetal and centrifugal 
(Foucault, 2006). Centripetal mechanisms aim to circumscribe a closed space of 
operations, and try to regulate everything within that space, establishing norms, 
operating according to the principle of the permitted and the forbidden, and taking 
up the smallest infraction and trying to control it. For centrifugal mechanisms 
however – which Foucault take to be central to ‘the game of liberalism’, '[n]ew 
elements are constantly being integrated: production, psychology, behavior, the 
ways of doing things of producers, buyers, consumers, importers, and exporters, 
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and the world market' (Foucault, 2006, p. 45). Security, here, involves allowing 
the development of ever-wider circuits: 'An apparatus of security…cannot operate 
well except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense [the word] 
acquires in the eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and privileges 
attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and 
processes of circulation of both people and things' (Foucault, 2006, p. 48). 
 Discussing contemporary developments in the context of 
biosecurity, Filippa Lentzos and I argued that such centrifugal mechanisms did 
indeed underpin security strategies in ‘advanced liberalism’ (Lentzos & Rose, 
2009). These strategies did not seek to enclose and delimit, but to govern open 
circuits, planes of movement of persons, commodities, information. In part, they 
worked not by means of fixed criteria, but by charting patterns and regularities in 
flows across these planes, identifying potential threats on the basis of stochastic 
variations that match patterns identified as suspicious. And crucially, they aimed 
to govern by instrumentalizing subjective states to ensure the vigilance required to 
secure security.  
 The security strategies being proposed in the new authoritarian 
populisms depart from this approach. All the ‘populists’ of this persuasion agree 
on the need to reorganize the border, and to do so in terms of a new racist 
biopolitics of the nation. The centrifugal aspect of circulation that relates to 
freedom of movement of both capital and of persons is reframed in terms of a 
‘centripetal’ strategy of security. Economic flows, or at least flows of goods, are 
to be subject to sets of specified norms of the permitted and the forbidden – or at 
least heavily taxed – in an attempt to secure its economy for its people. And the 
flows of persons are to be subject to a racist grid of possibilities and restrictions to 
secure the people against their enemies.  
As far as persons are concerned, these centripetal mechanisms do not 
merely repeat the biopolitical racism of the eugenic period, where it was a matter 
of inferior races proliferating, reproducing their kind and weakening the character 
or constitution of the race. Even in the case of Trump’s ‘extreme vetting’ it is not 
a matter of the vitality of the population, or at least not directly. To redeploy a 
term I first proposed some years ago, though it never really caught on, we may 
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say that it is an ‘ethopolitical’ form of biopolitics (Rose, 2000). By ethopolitics, I 
mean ‘attempts to shape the conduct of human beings by acting upon their 
sentiments, beliefs and values – in short, by acting on ethics. In the politics of our 
present … the ethos of human existence – the sentiments, moral nature or guiding 
beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions – has come to provide the ‘medium’ 
within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected 
up with the imperatives of good government. If ‘discipline’ individualizes and 
normalizes, and ‘biopolitics’ collectivizes and socializes, ethopolitics concerns 
itself with the self-techniques by which human beings should judge themselves 
and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they are’ (Rose, 2007, p. 
27).  
In contemporary authoritarian populism, this takes the form of a politics of 
identities, the ethical forms attached to the different races and their religious 
affiliations, their values, habits, personal practices, and their sexual relations. 
Such an ethopolitics does have an economic dimension, not that this was 
unknown in the early twentieth century, with all those cunning and money-
grabbing Jews and so forth, who worked all hours and enriched themselves at our 
expense. Today, we can see an internally contradictory confection of concerns 
about the economic security of the people on the one hand – outrage about the 
illegals, the low paid workers, who undercut our own decent hard-working folk – 
and on the other, outrage about the costs to welfare of these racial outsiders, 
whose excessive breeding produces large families and thus place large demands 
on our precious welfare systems, yet who have never contributed to the people’s 
home which they now happily exploit: they are in it but not of it. And this is 
coupled with a biopolitics of race, framed not merely in terms of links between 
certain racialised religious groupings and the risk of terrorist violence, but more 
generally in terms of a conflict of values, between our true people whose identity 
is threatened by those from outside with different values – not necessarily deemed 
inferior, but sometimes merely radically distinct from ours – and also those who, 
because they challenge such an identity in the name of the pluralism of values and 
of cosmopolitanism – are indeed the moral enemy within, enemies of the people. 
This is ‘ethopolitics’ with a vengeance. 
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However, there are differences, especially between Europe and the United 
States. In Europe, the social principle remains strong among the new authoritarian 
populists. Each of the European authoritarian populist parties make a commitment 
to their people – the true Finns, the real Danes, the authentic French and so forth – 
to maintain, even to enhance, certain of the policies and practices commonly 
associated with the left. Thus, for example, the True Finns, who defend 
Finnishness as a set of values and a national identify, support a strong welfare 
state; support a strong educational system which will promote this cultural 
identity; support a tax system in part because it emerges from symbolizes and 
guarantees the solidarity and unity of ‘the people’. But all this is only for the True 
Finns. Indeed, from this perspective, it is the costs to the state of those who are 
not ‘the true people’ – those outsiders and enemies within – which are responsible 
for much of the austerity that has radically undercut welfare provision, coupled 
with new modes of individualization, responsibilization, outsourcing and the 
valorization of work; subjected so many to absurd tests of employability, rendered 
welfare payments discretionary rather than as of right, and transformed welfare 
recipients into scroungers. Hence for those others, when they have not already 
been denied access to the territory, and where they cannot be expelled, access to 
those rights and benefits should be denied or limited: those are only for the real 
people who have created the people’s home, and for whom that people’s home is 
intended to be home.  
The need for security, here, is not simply a matter of insecurity: in this 
way of thinking, we are not so much ‘insecure’ as ‘vulnerable’ – our daily lives 
are vulnerable, our values are vulnerable, our people are vulnerable, our nation is 
vulnerable – we live in a state of pervasive vulnerability. In the face of this 
vulnerability, we need to draw upon, celebrate and enhance the individual and 
collective resilience of our people, resilience which was, for so long, and for 
many, threatened by over-reliance on the state and public authorities for 
protection. Hence we see the emergence of a range of new strategies and 
technologies for inculcating, enhancing and celebrating resilience that I have 
described elsewhere (Lentzos & Rose, 2009). More significantly, as I have 
suggested, in the name of securing liberty within enclosed territories, we are 
seeing the reactivation of centripetal mechanisms, framed in terms of ‘control’. A 
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new set of strategies is set in place, which are re-spatialising and circumscribing 
the national territory and seeking to know and to control as much as possible 
within that space, perhaps now not simply in terms of rigid norms and simple 
distinctions of what is permitted and what is forbidden, but in terms of a certain 
bandwidth of liberty. While in previous times, centripetal mechanisms always ran 
up against the problems of knowledge, of how to know each and all, perhaps 
today, things are different, at least in the imagination of the authorities. The 
dream of perfect knowledge of a population left at liberty becomes possible with 
the surveillance of cyberspace, the tracking not just via webcams but via 
smartphone operations, credit and debit cards, twitter use, Facebook and the like, 
creating virtual identities for each of us, that can be mined by algorithms, fuelled 
by machine intelligence to search for known patterns, and then ‘red flagged’ by 
algorithms for the attention of authorities. Here liberty is twinned with control, in 
the negative sense of management and constraint of unwelcome persons, actions, 
flows or events. We know when it fails only too well, but we also occasionally 
glimpse how well it succeeds. 
 
Post neoliberal governmentality? 
As I have said, I don’t much like the term ‘neoliberalism’ which has become a 
catch-all both to describe or explain and to condemn almost everything one does 
not like about our present conjuncture – from the planet of slums for which Mike 
Davis blames neoliberalism (Davis, 2006), to the epidemic of loneliness, eating 
disorders and self-harm in the United Kingdom which George Monbiot blames on 
neoliberalism.20 All too often, to adapt an aphorism from another context 
'Neoliberalism… in addition to being itself and the result of itself, is also the 
cause of itself' (Davis, 2006).21 Against the convictions of these critics of 
neoliberalism, who seem so certain about what has happened and what is 
happening, I would urge some caution: when political theorists of the future look 
back on our age, it is not clear what new configurations of authority, truth and 
ethics they will identify as having emerged at the end of the twentieth century, 
and what happened to them in the first half of the twenty-first century. But I 
began these reflections with the question of freedom, so let me conclude by 
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considering what has happened to freedom – is this still the question which might 
lead us to the heart of these new rationalities, or has it been reduced to a mere 
rhetorical device?  
Perhaps one way to think about this is to reflect on the distinction between 
governing through freedom and governing in the name of liberty. No doubt it 
would be a mistake to believe that etymology could resolve the issue for us: there 
are many more or less scholarly arguments that point to the fact that the words 
used in English have different roots: liberty from the Latin, freedom from the 
Germanic. If one consults the Oxford English Dictionary, the definitions and 
usages of the words freedom and liberty intertwine, frequently referring to one 
another. Nonetheless, as Hanna Pitkin (1988) has argued, while the difference 
between freedom and liberty is subtle and shifting, it is there – at least for 
speakers of English.22 From my own perspective, if we consider language less for 
what it means than for what it does as an ‘intellectual technology’ in particular 
contexts of usage, we can perhaps see that freedom has a subjective dimension 
that is lacking in liberty (except in phrases such as ‘taking a bit of a liberty’!) 
Governing through freedom, that is to say, entails a set of practices that instill, 
shape and support a specific form of selfhood, in which each individual is to 
construct and construe their life as the outcome of notionally free choices, 
surrounded, instructed and cajoled by an array of little experts of the psyche. But, 
as Pitkin puts it, governing in the name of liberty implies ‘something more 
formal, rational, and limited than freedom; it concerns rules and exceptions within 
a system of rules. It concerns neither objects, incapable of rule-governed conduct, 
nor the depths of the psyche from which spontaneity springs. At most … it 
implies firm, rational control of those mysterious depths and of the dangerous 
passions found there, not their expression in action. In other words, although 
liberty means the absence of (some particular) constraint, at the same time it 
implies the continuation of a surrounding network of restraint and order’ (Pitkin, 
1988, p. 543). It is true that to live in liberty requires each of us to govern our 
passions and our will. As Mill stressed in his Introduction to On liberty, this is a 
condition of civilized self-conduct (Mill, 1859; see the discussion in Valverde, 
1996). But the passions and will have to be controlled, not to engender the desires 
of choice and the aspirations of self-realization that became associated with 
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freedom in the 1980s, but in order to enable the citizen to conduct him or herself 
in liberty, in a political environment of laws, regulations and controls23. 
Governing through liberty, then, rather than in the name of freedom. Does 
any of this matter? I think it does, not just because we find a certain, perhaps 
ephemeral, version of a post-neoliberal governmentality in the rise of 
authoritarian populism. But more because, if previous mutations in 
governmentalities are anything to go by, we might well expect elements of these 
new governmentalities to spread beyond their initial confines, and to be 
incorporated within the rationalities and strategies of those who oppose these 
populists. Liberty, security, control – perhaps somewhere in the new relations 
among these terms – not in the realm of semantics but in political strategies – we 
might find the clues to the regimes of government that are emerging ‘after 
neoliberalism.’ Perhaps those on the left, rather than deriding them, might do well 
to explore the grounds for their emergence, and their potential for progressive re-
articulation. In the mutations that are under way, while we may be at liberty, we 
undoubtedly remain ‘birds on the wire’. But we are no longer obliged to try, in 
our way, to be free, but to hope to live in a controlled world where our 
vulnerabilities are understood and managed, and where we can experience a kind 
of security.24  
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Notes 
                                                     
1  This paper was prepared as a talk for a Conference on 'Freedom after neoliberalism' held at York University 
in the United Kingdom in June 2017 – this is the reason I revisited my earlier work on freedom. Thanks to 
Dr. Adam Kelly and Dr. Alex Beaumont for inviting me, and Harriet Neal for assistance with logistics. I have 
made some revisions in the light of very helpful comments from those who attended, and from the editors of 
Economy and Society, but have followed their advice and kept the style of a spoken talk, and kept references 
to a minimum. The title mystified many. Did I not realise, someone remarked, that we live in a wireless 
world? But for those who, like me, grew up with Leonard Cohen’s voice, I hope the sense will become clear: 
I chose it on the day his death was announced. 
2  Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsVxEZNIJpI  
3  I discuss my reasons for preferring this term in Powers of freedom (Rose, 1999b): in part this was because the 
strategies that emerged from the mid-1980s onwards were heterogeneous, certainly not a ‘realisation’ of the 
ideas of neoliberals, and incorporated many elements from radically different political rationalities. Markets 
remain regulated, governments remain interventionist, technologies for governing have been invented – for 
example, those involving ‘governing through communities’ (Rose, 1996) – which were never dreamed of by 
any of the original neoliberals, nor by the Chicago economists, or by proponents of the ‘Washington 
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Consensus’. Rajesh Venugopal has provided an excellent recent critical analysis (Venugopal, 2015). My 
reservations remain, despite some critics feeling vindicated by the fact that the International Monetary Fund 
has recently published an article that uses this very term to characterize a rather more limited set of policies – 
‘increased competition—achieved through deregulation and the opening up of domestic markets, including 
financial markets, to foreign competition [and] a smaller role for the state, achieved through privatization and 
limits on the ability of governments to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt’ and to argue that some of the 
effects of these policies, such as increased inequality, are actually inimical to growth and should be addressed 
by policy makers (Ostry et al., 2016) – see https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-
the-idea-that-changed-the-world  
4  There is, of course, a very long debate in political philosophy about the history and meaning of freedom. My 
concern however, is with what one might term the ‘operative philosophy’ of rationalities and strategies for 
the conduct of conduct. While these sometimes draw upon elements of these debates, they never merely 
‘express’ them, and are never reducible to them  
5  We could probably add Turkey’s Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party to this list, though the idea 
of liberty seems rather foreign to him. Justice, however, as Thomas Osborne has pointed out, is indeed a 
recurrent theme in populist discourse – and all sorts of authoritarian measures are often justified in the name 
of justice for those who have been denied justice, while at the same time, those very populists are often 
accused of subverting justice. 
6  This was the title of the conference at which I was speaking, hence the quote marks. 
7  When I was working on this issue, I was particularly struck by Hayek’s discussion in the third volume of 
Law, legislation and liberty: The political economy of a free people: ‘Man has not developed in freedom ... 
Freedom is an artifact of civilisation ...Freedom was made possible by the gradual evolution of the discipline 
of civilization which is at the same time the discipline of freedom’ (Hayek, 1979). 
8  In this context it is interesting to note the rise of the ‘psy’ professions in China, and the development of what 
some have termed ‘therapeutic governance’ (Yang, 2015; Zhang, 2017a; Zhang, 2017b).   
9  Since I wrote the lecture on which this paper is based, Economy and Society has published a number of 
‘deflationary’ analyses of populism (Molyneux & Osborne, 2017; Thompson, 2017). While I have learned a 
lot from these discussions, as will be seen, I take a rather different approach, and have maintained the original 
argument in my lecture here. 
10  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-fn-idUSKBN15J007  
11  The full speech is available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-
in-full/  
12  This was a rather infamous headline in the Daily Mail on 22 August 2017, over an article expressing ‘Fury 
over “out of touch” judges who have “declared war on democracy” by defying 17.4m Brexit voters and who 
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